
2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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President: Mr. Labbé (Vice-President) (Chile)
later: Mr. Biontino (Vice-President) (Germany)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

General debate (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Klimkin** (Ukraine) said that his country had voluntarily renounced nuclear weapons and had eliminated its nuclear arsenal inherited from the former Soviet Union. However, the Ukrainian success story had been ruined by the recent Russian aggression, which blatantly violated the 1994 Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Budapest Memorandum). In crushing overnight the positive vision of global security embodied in the Ukrainian model, the Russian Federation had violated the Charter of the United Nations and severely undermined the Treaty. Russian aggression against Ukraine would lead States to conclude that political and legal agreements were not sufficient to guarantee the inviolability of State borders. He expressed gratitude to those States that had supported the territorial integrity of Ukraine, but called for more action from the international community.

2. Over the previous year, the Russian Federation had turned the Autonomous Republic of Crimea from a resort location into a military base that could well be used for the deployment of nuclear weapons. He expressed concern about unilateral actions by the Russian Federation that violated the Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the status and conditions of deployment of the Black Sea fleet of the Russian Federation in the territory of Ukraine, of 28 May 1997. Statements by Russian officials asserting the right of the Russian Federation to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine were a threat to the non-nuclear status of Ukraine.

3. The Russian Federation was occupying territory containing nuclear facilities, notably the Sevastopol National University of Nuclear Energy and Industry in Crimea, and Russian ceasefire violations were posing a threat to installations in eastern Ukraine. Even in the face of the Russian aggression, his country remained committed to the Treaty. It supported the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and called on States that had not done so to conclude safeguards agreements and additional protocols with the Agency.

4. Ukraine had been a member of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism since 2007. It

urged universalization of the Treaty, the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty, and the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. It had supported both General Assembly resolution 67/56, which had established the open-ended working group to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, and the conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons held in Oslo, Nayarit, Mexico, and Vienna.

5. Violation by the Russian Federation of the Budapest Memorandum demonstrated that negative security assurances could not be relied on. What was needed was a legally binding document on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. The Conference must also adopt a document on the modalities for the implementation of article X of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation on procedures for withdrawing from the Treaty. Ukraine supported efforts to bring the Russian Federation back into the legal framework of the Charter of the United Nations, the IAEA Statute, the Treaty and related documents such as the Budapest Memorandum, and hoped that the situation regarding the territorial integrity of Ukraine would be taken into consideration in the Conference's final document.

6. **Mr. Pedersen** (Norway) said that the use of weapons of mass destruction during the civil war in Syria, nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the illegal Russian annexation of Crimea and destabilization of eastern Ukraine were clear violations of various international obligations. Nevertheless, there had been some positive developments, including the Nuclear Security Summits, progress in the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear programme, and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. While the continued implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty) was welcome, progress on article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty calling for general and complete disarmament had been slow. He urged the Russian Federation to respond positively to the United States proposal to reduce the number of strategic nuclear warheads by an additional one third.

7. The international community should work constructively to reach agreement on a number of points that would strengthen the Non-Proliferation

Treaty and its three pillars: the New START Treaty must be regarded as a first step in a process of nuclear arms reduction that would eventually include all types of nuclear weapons and prohibit the development of new ones; disarmament should be pursued based on the principles of transparency, verification and irreversibility; the process of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies must be accelerated by, among other measures, enhancing negative security assurances; existing nuclear-weapon-free zones must be strengthened and new ones created; and progress should be made toward establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

8. Real progress must be made towards entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and negotiations must begin on a fissile material cut-off treaty; IAEA must be strengthened, on the understanding that its comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols protected the world as a whole and facilitated the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and all fissile materials must be secured. In that connection, it was encouraging that a growing number of civilian research nuclear reactors were being converted from high-enriched to low-enriched uranium. His country, for example, had also discontinued the use of highly radioactive sources in its hospitals. Lastly, the Conference should reaffirm the right to peaceful nuclear power applications.

9. To strengthen its support for the work of IAEA and the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, his country had decided to provide financial support to the Agency's Peaceful Uses Initiative. It had participated in the international conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, held in Oslo, Nayarit, Mexico, and Vienna, and signed the joint statements on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons issued following those conferences. He encouraged nuclear-weapon States in particular to sign those documents.

10. His delegation also hoped to see the humanitarian perspective reflected in the outcome document of the Review Conference. Jointly with that of the United Kingdom, his Government was sponsoring an initiative on nuclear warhead dismantlement, and supported the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification launched by the United States of America. In conjunction with Sweden, Norway had also established a long-term partnership with Ukraine to

strengthen the safety and security of that country's nuclear power plants.

11. **Mr. Kmentt** (Austria) said that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was seriously challenged in several aspects, with the prospect of universalization becoming more remote. His Government regretted that the Helsinki conference that was supposed to launch the process for the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East had not yet been held, and hoped that one of the outcomes of the Review Conference would be a renewed impetus to convene that conference as early as possible.

12. His Government was gravely concerned at the continuing build-up of a nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles programme in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It therefore called on that country to cease its provocative policies and dangerous rhetoric and to engage in serious denuclearization negotiations, which would benefit not only the rest of the world but also its isolated population. Recent progress in negotiations over the Iranian nuclear programme was encouraging, and a successful conclusion would be an important gain for the Treaty's credibility. The verification regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty had been impressively validated in recent years, notably through the on-site inspection exercise in Jordan. He urged all Annex 2 countries to sign that Treaty without delay so that it could enter into force.

13. It was unfortunate that the violation of the Budapest Memorandum and the rhetoric emerging from the crisis in Ukraine had brought nuclear brinkmanship back to the European continent. Austria strongly opposed the view that nuclear disarmament and arms control efforts should be halted completely owing to that crisis. It also believed that nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence were not the answer to the security concerns in Europe.

14. The action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) was supposed to have restored credibility to the Treaty after the disappointing results in implementing the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agreed to in 1995 and the 13 steps for nuclear disarmament agreed to in 2000. The lack of progress on the implementation of article VI of the Treaty and the disarmament part of that

action plan was a cause for serious concern. Instead of a move away from reliance on nuclear weapons, there had been increasing talk of nuclear weapons being necessary for national security, and large budget allocations had been made for the modernization of nuclear weapons and infrastructure. While not in direct violation of the letter of the Treaty, such plans were contrary to the spirit of article VI and the commitments made at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences. When the very same permanent Security Council members whose responsibility it was to uphold the Treaty promoted the value of nuclear weapons to their own security, a credibility deficit was created.

15. His country had been involved in past review cycle efforts to take the disarmament agenda forward. It had promoted the restart of negotiations in the dysfunctional Conference on Disarmament after the 2010 high-level meeting of the General Assembly devoted to revitalizing that body, and had worked to establish an open-ended working group to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons, as envisioned in General Assembly resolution 67/56. It had hosted the December 2014 Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, where it had issued a national pledge to cooperate with all stakeholders to identify and pursue effective measures to fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons, and in efforts to stigmatize, prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons in light of their unacceptable humanitarian consequences and associated risks. That pledge had been endorsed by nearly 80 States. The humanitarian perspective provided a powerful set of arguments for disarmament and non-proliferation alike.

16. **Mr. Kolga** (Estonia) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was indeed the cornerstone of the global efforts to pursue nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Estonia fully supported the three pillars of the Treaty and the implementation of all commitments assumed under it or during previous Review Conferences and of the 2010 action plan. All States parties without exception had a shared responsibility to implement the action plan and to contribute constructively to strengthening each pillar of the Treaty. The current Review Conference provided them with both an opportunity and a responsibility to renew their commitments in that regard.

17. By illegally annexing Crimea and taking aggressive actions against Ukraine, the Russian Federation had clearly violated, among other international agreements and norms, the Budapest Memorandum. The strategic decision by the Ukrainian Government to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear State in return for security assurances had been the right one. The Russian Federation should therefore refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine, end its illegal annexation of Crimea and take immediate and concrete steps to fully implement the Minsk agreements.

18. With respect to treaty-based nuclear disarmament and arms control, there was a need for renewed multilateral efforts to revitalize multilateral negotiating bodies, in particular the Conference on Disarmament. Global concerns about that body's agenda should be negotiated on a non-discriminatory, transparent and multilateral basis, with wider participation by interested States. Estonia reiterated its request to participate fully and equally in disarmament discussions as a full member of the Conference on Disarmament, and called for the early nomination of a special rapporteur to review the issue of the future enlargement of that body.

19. The universalization and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was a top priority, and States, particularly those whose adherence was required for that Treaty to enter into force, should sign and ratify it without further delay. Estonia also supported the universality and implementation of the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation as the only multilateral, transparent and confidence-building instrument against ballistic missile proliferation.

20. Various international export control regimes had done important work on nuclear trade and non-proliferation, and all States should make use of multilaterally agreed guidelines and principles in developing their own national export controls. All States members of the European Union should consider joining the Missile Technology Control Regime, since they all met the highest non-proliferation standards and membership criteria of that Regime.

21. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was playing a leading role in supporting the goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons, and its system of safeguards was essential for the implementation of the Treaty, benefitting all States parties and creating confidence that facilitated the fullest possible international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Over the years, Estonia had contributed to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund and benefitted from its projects.

22. Building a climate of confidence and trust was essential to achieving progress on total nuclear disarmament in a universal and inclusive manner. Such trust should be built through the demonstrated implementation of concrete disarmament measures by all nuclear-weapon States and an ongoing commitment to non-proliferation by all non-nuclear-weapon States. The progress in implementing the New START Treaty was welcome, as was the dialogue among nuclear-weapon States, which had been recently enhanced through conferences held by the permanent five members of the Security Council and recent developments on a comprehensive solution that would enable Iran to enjoy its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

23. **Mr. Logar** (Slovenia) welcomed the recent agreement which defined the key parameters of a joint comprehensive plan of action between the international community and Iran, an important step in the process to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme and a comprehensive lifting of sanctions. He hoped that a final plan of action would be adopted before the third quarter in 2015.

24. The principle of balanced progress on all three pillars of the Treaty should guide States parties throughout the Review Conference and towards the adoption of a substantive final document. Although less progress had been made on nuclear disarmament since the 2010 Review Conference than expected, Slovenia continued to share the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and believed in treaty-based disarmament. In that connection, future global nuclear disarmament endeavours should include the universalization of both the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Test-Ban Treaty and the commencement and early finalization of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. The work of the group of governmental experts on such a treaty and the new draft treaty presented in the Conference on Disarmament by France were welcome developments in that regard.

25. The Russian Federation and the United States should continue discussing nuclear weapons reduction through the START process, which should include non-strategic nuclear weapons as well. However, nuclear disarmament was not the duty of those two States alone, but also that of the other nuclear-weapon States. All States should adhere to IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols as soon as possible. The Agency should continue and further develop the State-level concept, which would strengthen both its safeguards system and the international community's joint non-proliferation efforts. A reference to the importance of that concept should be included in the outcome document of the current Review Conference.

26. His Government condemned the non-compliance with the Treaty by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Syria and hoped that a final agreement on the Iranian nuclear programme could be reached by the end of June 2015. On the issue of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, all States parties had an inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful and civilian purposes. Slovenia supported, contributed to and benefitted from the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, including the Technical Cooperation Fund, and supported the Peaceful Uses Initiative.

27. Lastly, his delegation regretted that the conference on the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East had not yet been convened and encouraged States in the region to reach agreement on the agenda of that conference. It also believed that, in the future, the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons should be streamlined into the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and not elsewhere.

28. **Mr. Khiari** (Tunisia) said that the Treaty on Non-Proliferation remained the keystone of the global non-proliferation regime and the crucial basis on which to pursue nuclear disarmament. Multilaterally agreed solutions, in line with the Charter of the United Nations, were the best way to find lasting solutions to the many international security and disarmament questions.

29. Nuclear-weapon States should undertake negotiations on a gradual process for the complete elimination of their arsenals within the framework of a nuclear weapons convention. They should fulfil the commitments made at the 2010 Review Conference in

that regard, without delay and through an accelerated negotiation process aimed at implementing the 13 practical steps for nuclear disarmament. States parties should use their best judgment to strike the right balance between their mutual obligations and their mutual responsibilities under the Treaty.

30. In the meantime, effective assurances should be provided against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. It seemed that the goal of strengthening security in the Middle East remained out of reach owing to the failure of Israel to adhere to the Treaty, despite repeated calls from the international community. All relevant parties should take urgent and practical measures to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.

31. All three pillars of the Treaty should be applied in a comprehensive and non-selective manner. None of the Treaty's provisions posed an obstacle to States' right to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, especially as that acquisition was more often a necessity than a choice, and as the financial and energy crises had highlighted the need to rethink nuclear energy and focus on its usefulness rather than on the undeniable risk of owning such weapons. Lastly, his delegation congratulated the State of Palestine for acceding to the Treaty.

32. **Ms. Nguyen** Phuong Nga (Viet Nam) said that States parties should reiterate the significance of and their commitment to the continued implementation of the Treaty, owing to the risk of nuclear catastrophe that still faced humankind. The three pillars of the regime should be implemented in a balanced manner. The commencement of negotiations on a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons would represent a strong signal of States parties' firm commitment to nuclear disarmament. The conclusion of legally binding negative security assurances and the start of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty should also be advanced. States that had not yet done so should ratify the Test-Ban Treaty for it to enter into force as soon as possible.

33. Viet Nam welcomed the establishment and consolidation of nuclear-weapon-free zones around the world and the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia, and called for an early convening of an international conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction, as a crucial building block for the

credibility of the Treaty in the immediate term. Her Government was working closely with other States members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to further strengthen the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and looked forward to further consultations between the Association and the nuclear-weapon States with a view to the latter signing the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty as soon as possible.

34. States had a right to use of nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes. Developing States in particular should be assured the right of access to nuclear technology and material, in accordance with relevant obligations and standards. The International Atomic Energy Agency played a valuable role in ensuring nuclear safety and security and providing technical assistance to developing States; efforts should therefore be made to strengthen the Agency's capacity and resources. Viet Nam welcomed the recent agreement on Iran's nuclear programme and looked forward to the successful conclusion of the upcoming negotiations among the relevant parties on a comprehensive plan of action.

35. Over the past five years, Viet Nam had ratified an additional protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, acceded to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and ratified the Amendment thereto, participated in the activities of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and strengthened its legal and regulatory framework on nuclear safety and security. It had also stepped up its cooperation with a number of international partners on the development of its nuclear infrastructure; successfully implemented the core conversion from high-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium fuel at its Dalat research nuclear reactor in 2011; and had all spent high-enriched uranium fuels repatriated to the Russian Federation in July 2013.

36. Lastly, her country was an active member of the Nuclear Security Summit process, had joined the Proliferation Security Initiative and successfully fulfilled its responsibilities as Chair of the Board of Governors of IAEA for the term 2013-2014. The 2015 Review Conference should build upon the achievements of the 2010 Conference, with additions on long-pending and emerging issues, to arrive at a comprehensive, balanced outcome document that would provide a road map for States parties' collective efforts over the next five years.

37. **Mr. Dapkiunas** (Belarus) said that the Treaty on Non-Proliferation was essential to international security. Despite efforts to rid the world of nuclear weapons, the threat of their use continued to exist. The international rhetoric of peace and cooperation contrasted with the growing mistrust between Governments. Some 20 years in the past, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine had rejected, freely and without conditions, the presence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories. Belarus in particular attached great importance to the elimination of such weapons; it was unfortunate that a proposal made by his country in the 1990s to establish a central and eastern European zone free of nuclear weapons had failed to garner the necessary support. Belarus continued to fight against the development and production of new weapons of mass destruction. Yet a number of countries were modernizing their existing nuclear arsenals and seeking to develop new types of weapons of mass destruction. Belarus had a zero tolerance policy with regard to nuclear weapons, including nuclear research with a view to modernizing nuclear weapons; a nuclear arms race; and nuclear tests.

38. The most effective way to eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons was to adopt practical measures to build confidence and foster cooperation, based on the principles of non-threatening conduct and good-neighbourly relations. Such an approach should not seek merely to appeal to the nuclear-weapon States to reject their privileged status, but judiciously to establish conditions for the elimination of the nuclear threat.

39. The IAEA safeguards system was crucial for building trust. Belarus supported its continued development and was taking the necessary steps to ratify an additional protocol to its agreement with the Agency on the application of safeguards. The safeguards system should be improved on the basis of an open dialogue with all concerned countries, and cooperation between the IAEA secretariat and Governments should take place solely within the framework of the relevant international legal instruments. An objective and fair safeguards system and its support by all Member States would strengthen the non-proliferation regime, taking as its basis the Treaty on Non-Proliferation.

40. The Treaty was important also for its recognition of the inalienable right of all States parties to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Since the 2010 Review Conference, Belarus had built its first nuclear power plant. That strategic project, which had benefited from the

consultative expert assistance of IAEA, had considerably enhanced the country's energy security and had given impetus to its development in the technology and manufacturing sectors. Belarus was committed to complying with IAEA standards and to strictly observing its international obligations in nuclear matters.

41. *Mr. Biontino (Germany), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

42. **Archbishop Auza** (Observer for the Holy See) said that the Treaty was anchored in the dignity of the human person and in the collective recognition that nuclear weapons were inhumane and unethical and that a nuclear detonation would generate catastrophic humanitarian consequences. The failure to translate in good faith the obligations contained in the Treaty constituted a real threat to the survival of humankind as a whole. Concrete and effective steps should therefore be taken to collectively renew the commitment to the core principles of the Treaty. The safest and most effective path towards non-use was the mutual and total renunciation of those weapons and the effective dismantling of the infrastructure on which they depended. The theory of nuclear deterrence was too ambiguous to be a stable and global basis for world security and international order and had not delivered the sort of peace and stability expected.

43. The Treaty's discrimination between countries with and without nuclear weapons, which was meant to be provisional, had been turned into a permanent solution, a situation that was unsustainable and undesirable. If it was unthinkable to imagine a world where nuclear weapons were available to all, it was reasonable to imagine, and to work collectively for, a world where nobody had them. That was the letter and the spirit of the Treaty. The resources spent on nuclear weapons could, and indeed should, be put towards the development of societies and people. The world faced enormous challenges, and it was only through cooperation and solidarity among nations that it would be able to confront them. To continue investing in expensive weapon systems, in particular the production and modernization of nuclear weapons, was a waste of resources and in contradiction with the spirit of the Treaty.

44. The possession of nuclear weapons and reliance on nuclear deterrence had a very negative impact on relations between States. The concept of national security should not be used in a partial or biased

manner — with different standards being applied to nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States — and never in contradiction with the common good. It was artificial and simplistic to ignore the other elements necessary for security, including socioeconomic development, political participation and respect for fundamental human rights. The definition of national security advanced by States, especially nuclear-weapon States, should urgently be revisited in a transparent manner.

45. A world without nuclear weapons would not be easy to achieve, but that was neither a reason nor an excuse to not fulfil Treaty obligations. All energies and commitments in this area were necessary — and all the more so in times of international tensions — and the role of international organizations, religious communities, civil society and academic institutions was vital to not let hope die, nor cynicism and realpolitik take over. Only an ethic of cooperation, solidarity and peaceful coexistence, and not one based on the threat of mutually assured destruction, was a project worth undertaking for the future of humanity.

46. **Mr. Grima** (Malta) said that his country remained committed to the fundamental objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was still the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and called on all non-States parties to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. Malta welcomed the progress towards implementation of the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)), but called upon all States to respect all their obligations and commitments in that regard.

47. A world free of nuclear weapons remained a distant prospect that would be realized only if concerted efforts were made to that end. Moreover, the risk of nuclear proliferation continued to threaten international peace and security and there was an increasing risk that individuals or terrorist groups could gain access to weapons of mass destruction. The proliferation of those weapons and their delivery systems could have dire consequences on international security and stability, while their use would have a devastating impact on human health, the environment and the climate.

48. Malta had therefore endorsed the pledge made by the Austrian Government following the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear

Weapons in December 2014, because it confirmed its firm belief that nuclear weapons must never be used again. It also commended IAEA for its ongoing efforts to monitor implementation of the Treaty. Non-proliferation must be pursued through multilateral, peaceful and diplomatic means; the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament was a source of concern, and multilateral disarmament mechanisms, which had delivered very little, must be revitalized. Furthermore, non-States parties to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty must sign and ratify that instrument at the earliest opportunity with a view to facilitating its entry into force.

49. His delegation welcomed the understanding reached between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany, and encouraged all the relevant parties to continue their efforts to conclude by the end of June 2015 a comprehensive agreement on the Iranian nuclear programme that would provide for the lifting of the sanctions imposed on that country. In particular, it commended the emphasis placed in that understanding on IAEA inspections and transparency modalities. It also welcomed the agreement by Iran to implement the additional protocol to its safeguards agreement and to allow greater access and information on its nuclear programme to the Agency.

50. Malta also called upon Syria to cooperate fully with IAEA to remedy its non-compliance with its safeguards agreement and implement in full the additional protocol to that agreement. It condemned the nuclear tests carried out by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in February 2013 and the country's threat of further nuclear testing, which constituted a violation of its international obligations. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea must abandon its nuclear weapons programme and return to the Treaty and its IAEA safeguards agreement.

51. Lastly, his delegation welcomed the signing by the nuclear-weapon States of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in Central Asia, and the ratification of that Treaty by France and the United Kingdom, and called for the conference on establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East to be convened at the earliest opportunity, on the basis of arrangements agreed to by the States of the region.

52. **Mr. Mamabolo** (South Africa) said that his country remained committed to the Treaty and its three equally important pillars, namely nuclear disarmament,

nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The year 2015 marked not only the twentieth anniversary of the indefinite extension of the Treaty, but also the seventieth anniversary of the nuclear bombing of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the light of those key milestones, the international community must consider whether it had indeed made every effort to avert the devastation of nuclear war, and must adopt measures to safeguard the security of peoples.

53. Although the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) contained an extensive action plan, that did not mean that States parties were satisfied with the progress made in the implementation of previous agreements or that confidence among States parties had been restored. In fact, most States parties remained seriously concerned about the lack of urgency and seriousness in respect of previous undertakings, particularly with regard to nuclear disarmament. The success of the current or any other Review Conference would be determined by the extent to which States parties fulfilled those undertakings.

54. Nuclear weapons were inhumane and had unacceptable humanitarian consequences, and it was inconceivable that their use could be consistent with international law under any circumstances. Nuclear disarmament was not only an international legal obligation, but a moral and ethical imperative. In that connection, South Africa welcomed the outcomes of the three international conferences that had been held on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, which were integral to advancing action 1 of the 2010 action plan. It had also endorsed pledge made by the Austrian Government following the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, which reflected long-standing South African policies.

55. The humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons represented a powerful argument against the retention of nuclear weapons by certain States because of what they perceived were their security interests. The Treaty could not succeed unless it focused on enhanced security for all the world's peoples, and security could only be achieved through the total and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons, which was the only means by which the threat of catastrophe and mass annihilation could be averted.

56. The establishment and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons required a collective

commitment to all three pillars of the Treaty. However, while there had been significant progress in the area of nuclear non-proliferation, many agreed-upon actions concerning nuclear disarmament had not been implemented. The entry into force and indefinite extension of the Treaty, and the outcomes of the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences had established the necessary conditions for nuclear disarmament. Indeed, progress in that area could and should have been achieved since 2010, including with regard to reductions in the number of nuclear weapons deployed outside the territories of nuclear-weapon States. Instead, those States and their allies continued to rely on nuclear weapons as integral elements of their military and security doctrines and some 1,800 nuclear warheads remained on high-alert status.

57. Retaining those weapons was irresponsible and encouraged proliferation, thereby undermining the very Treaty that States claimed to uphold. There were no right hands for wrong weapons, and no justification for spending vast sums to upgrade nuclear weapons systems, particularly when the world was struggling to meet the basic needs of billions of people and achieve agreed-upon development goals. While nuclear-weapon States were implementing commendable mutual confidence-building measures, they must also build trust with non-nuclear-weapon States. The international community could no longer afford to conclude hollow agreements every five years that merely seemed to perpetuate the status quo, but must bring a decisive end to what amounted to "nuclear apartheid".

58. His delegation urged the Review Conference to commit to a thorough consideration of all possible options for a framework of effective measures for achieving a world without nuclear weapons, in line with article VI of the Treaty. It also supported a systematic, step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament, including through a framework agreement of mutually reinforcing legally binding instruments, and called for an open, multilateral process with clear benchmarks and timelines that would provide for transparent, verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament measures.

59. It was encouraging to see the large number of States that had concluded safeguards agreements and additional protocols with IAEA since 2010. Such agreements facilitated the transfer of nuclear technology to and the use of nuclear energy by developing countries. IAEA was the only internationally recognized competent authority responsible for verifying and

assuring compliance with the safeguards agreements of States parties. His delegation called for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. Such zones enhanced global and regional peace and security and strengthened the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

60. Peaceful nuclear cooperation and access to the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, one of the core objectives of the Treaty, could accelerate the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and further the post-2015 development agenda. Indeed, the inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology was of particular importance in attaining sustainable and accelerated economic growth in Africa. South Africa highly valued the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, which made a significant contribution to addressing the socioeconomic needs and sustainable development challenges of developing countries, and enabled the Agency to meet its statutory objective of accelerating and enlarging the contribution of atomic energy to global peace, health and prosperity. The Programme must therefore be allocated adequate and predictable funding.

61. Lastly, his delegation had taken note of proposals to elaborate a common understanding of the withdrawal provision of article X and believed that a similar approach should be taken with regard to other articles of the Treaty. For instance, a systematic analysis of articles I and II could lead to a common understanding on issues such as nuclear-sharing arrangements, while an analysis of articles IV and VI could help determine whether the core objectives of the Treaty had been met and what remained to be done.

62. **Mr. Ahsan** (Bangladesh) said that his country condemned the use of nuclear energy for destructive purposes and deplored the fact that vast sums of money were spent on nuclear arms. It was important to remember, however, that nuclear energy could also be used peacefully to promote development. The current Review Conference must address both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation with equal importance and urgency, since the continued existence of nuclear weapons meant that there was an ever-present risk that, whether by accident or by design, they could be used; reducing the number of deployed weapons and lowering the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems was no substitute for their complete elimination.

63. Nuclear-weapon States should therefore fulfil, in good faith, their long overdue legal obligations under article VI of the Treaty, and comply with their undertakings in line with the practical steps set forth in the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference. Negotiations should begin at the earliest opportunity in the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 68/32. Nuclear-weapon States must pursue nuclear disarmament in a time-bound manner and refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

64. Bangladesh supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all parts of the world, and welcomed the understanding reached on the key parameters of a comprehensive agreement on the Iranian nuclear programme. That understanding would foster regional peace and stability and reaffirm the importance of dialogue in the peaceful resolution of disputes.

65. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which Bangladesh ratified in 2000, was an essential step towards achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. All States that had not yet ratified that Treaty were therefore strongly urged to do so. Negotiations must also begin, without any further delay, on an effective, non-discriminatory, legally binding and internationally verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty that, inter alia, addressed existing stocks of fissile material. Full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was of the essence, particularly since it emphasized the inalienable right of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

66. Bangladesh was building a nuclear power plant in accordance with the safeguards agreement it had concluded with IAEA in 1982 and believed that IAEA safeguards and verification regimes were effective mechanisms for verifying States parties' commitments to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. All States parties must engage in multilateral diplomacy and implement appropriate confidence-building measures to increase trust among States with a view to achieving universal adherence to the Treaty.

67. **Ms. Tan** (Singapore) said that the legitimacy and relevance of the Treaty as a non-proliferation instrument

was increasingly being called into question. There had been only limited progress towards implementation of the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference, particularly by nuclear-weapon States, while certain States steadfastly refused to accede to the Treaty. Discourse regarding the three pillars of the Treaty had become increasingly political, divisive and characterized by complaints of non-compliance and bias, while the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction had been indefinitely postponed. As a result, there was growing mistrust between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. It was therefore crucial that all States parties should reaffirm their commitment to the Treaty and fully comply with their Treaty obligations.

68. With regard to nuclear disarmament, despite ongoing engagement by nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States on various issues, including the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, a voluntary moratorium on nuclear detonations and the New START Treaty, little concrete progress had been made on the implementation of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by nuclear-weapon States, some of which appeared particularly reluctant to contemplate substantive cuts to their nuclear arsenals. That would only reinforce the perception that those States believed that nuclear deterrence must remain an integral part of their long-term national security doctrines.

69. Accordingly, nuclear-weapon States must commit to significantly reduce their nuclear arsenals in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner, including within the framework of the New START Treaty, and refrain from testing or upgrading their nuclear weapons. All countries, particularly all remaining Annex 2 countries, should sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the earliest opportunity. Progress also needed to be made in the Conference on Disarmament on negotiations regarding a fissile material cut-off treaty. The 2015 Review Conference must explore ways to engage constructively with non-States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with a view to facilitating its universalization.

70. Singapore welcomed the fact that two nuclear-weapon States had attended the Vienna International Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, held in December 2014, and hoped that a stronger focus on the humanitarian consequences of

nuclear weapons would spur greater commitment by States parties to uphold their Treaty obligations.

71. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones would strengthen global peace and security. Her Government therefore urged all nuclear-weapon States to sign and ratify the protocols to treaties establishing such zones, without submitting any reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations in that regard, and to withdraw any existing reservations or declarations. In particular, nuclear-weapon States should sign and ratify without reservations the Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone to ensure that it entered into force at the earliest opportunity. Moreover, the failure to convene a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction had threatened to derail the current Review Conference. Singapore strongly encouraged all relevant stakeholders to reaffirm their political support for that conference and ensure that it was held as soon as possible.

72. The mandate and operational capacity of IAEA must be strengthened so that the Agency could more effectively encourage non-proliferation. In particular, IAEA must seek to enhance the security of fissile material that was destined for both civilian and non-civilian purposes. All States parties to the Treaty that had not yet concluded and implemented comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols with the Agency should do so without delay. Furthermore, a mechanism was needed to encourage non-States parties to the Treaty that possessed nuclear weapon capabilities to abide by the same rules and safeguards as States parties.

73. Ways must also be found to address the issue of Treaty non-compliance. In that regard, the nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the implications of that country's withdrawal from the Treaty remained key areas of concern. Her Government strongly urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return to the Treaty. Robust global export control regimes were also needed to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear material, without at the same time, impeding legitimate trade. Her country was a global transportation hub and was committed to fulfilling its non-proliferation obligations while safeguarding its position within global supply chains. It stood ready to share its experience in that area, including within the framework of the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Asian Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation.

74. Lastly, every State party to the Treaty enjoyed the inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It was important, however, that all States should reassure the international community of the peaceful nature of their nuclear programmes and adhere to relevant IAEA safeguards and norms. In that regard, Singapore warmly welcomed the recent agreement reached on the parameters of a joint plan of action on the Iranian nuclear programme, and hoped that follow-up negotiations would lead to a comprehensive agreement guaranteeing the exclusively peaceful character of that programme by the June 2015 deadline.

75. **Mr. Lasso Mendoza** (Ecuador), speaking on behalf of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), reaffirmed the Community's pride in being the world's first nuclear-weapon-free zone to have been established in a densely populated area, through the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco). The commitment of CELAC to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation had been confirmed from its very foundation, in 2011, at which time relevant Heads of State and Government had adopted a special communiqué on the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The region had also been proclaimed as a zone of peace at its second summit held in Havana in January 2014.

76. He expressed deep concern at the humanitarian impact of the use of nuclear weapons, a matter which should be addressed in every discussion on nuclear weapons, and welcomed the successful conclusion of the three conferences on that topic held in Norway in 2013 and Austria and Mexico in 2014. The conferences had highlighted, inter alia, that nuclear weapons were a serious threat to security and development; that no State or international organization had the capacity to provide sufficient humanitarian assistance in case of a nuclear blast; and that the detonation of nuclear weapons, whether by accident or by design, was an ongoing risk.

77. In that context, CELAC supported the start of a multilateral diplomatic process for a legally binding instrument that would prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner, within a multilaterally agreed time frame. To that end, he was in favour of the proposal made by Cuba at the third conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. Such an instrument was necessary to achieving nuclear disarmament and would fulfil the obligation of all States parties under article

VI of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation. In that connection, the Heads of State and Government at the CELAC summit held in Costa Rica in January 2015 had endorsed the pledge made by the Austrian Government following the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons.

78. He noted with regret that even as the United Nations was finalizing the post-2015 development agenda, nuclear-weapon States continued to invest heavily in maintaining and modernizing their nuclear arsenals. Nuclear disarmament was a socioeconomic imperative for the international community; he urged nuclear-weapon States to allocate more resources to developing countries for the promotion of peace and sustainable development.

79. CELAC remained firmly in favour of the full, balanced and non-discriminatory implementation of the three main pillars of the Treaty — namely, nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy — and, referring to article VI of the Treaty, reiterated its concern at the failure of States to make progress towards nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, the Treaty must be made universal: States that had not yet done so should accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States. Nuclear-weapon States must comply with their commitments towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons: specifically, he urged them to implement, without further delay, the 13 steps to disarmament agreed at the 2000 Review Conference and the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)).

80. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, constituted an important contribution to the achievement of nuclear disarmament and to the strengthening of international peace and security and the non-proliferation regime. The Treaty of Tlatelolco and the experience of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) in that regard remained political, legal and institutional reference points for the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world.

81. CELAC urged nuclear-weapon States to withdraw all interpretative declarations to the Protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, as they constituted factual

reservations prohibited by that Treaty, and to respect the denuclearized nature of the Latin American and Caribbean region, thus helping to prevent the introduction, and eliminate the possible use, of nuclear weapons against the countries of the region. CELAC regretted the failure to hold a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and called for the conference to be convened as soon as possible.

82. The step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament had failed to achieve the objectives of the Treaty or the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, or to initiate negotiations for a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (fissile material cut-off treaty). He called on all States, particularly those with nuclear weapons, to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their strategic doctrines, security policies and military strategies and to reduce the operational readiness of such weapons. Likewise, he urged those countries that had joined extended nuclear deterrence policies in the framework of military alliances to renounce their reliance on the nuclear weapons of other States for security.

83. The international community could not continue to tolerate the existence of nuclear weapons after banning all other weapons of mass destruction. Further, the indefinite extension of the Treaty agreed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference did not confer the right to indefinitely possess nuclear weapons. The current Review Conference must forge an ambitious path forward, taking into consideration the developments since the 2010 Review Conference. Simply rolling over previously agreed plans of action was unacceptable, especially given the lacklustre implementation of most of the disarmament-related actions.

84. **Mr. Raytchev** (Bulgaria) said that as the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, the Treaty on Non-Proliferation had made the world a significantly safer place. The current security environment, however, was complex and it was important for States parties to renew their commitment to the implementation of the Treaty and to the further strengthening of its regime. While progress on the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference had been slow, it was the collective responsibility of all States parties to ensure its implementation across the three pillars of the Treaty.

85. A common understanding of the steps needed to advance nuclear disarmament would require an inclusive and comprehensive dialogue, with the substantive participation of nuclear-weapon States. Creating conditions for a world without nuclear weapons must take into account both humanitarian and security considerations. Bulgaria supported a constructive, realistic and gradual approach to eliminating nuclear weapons, involving such steps as overcoming the current impasse in the Conference on Disarmament, including through its expansion, and starting negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. In addition, the swift entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was crucial for furthering the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

86. All obligations under the Treaty on Non-Proliferation should be fulfilled in good faith. In that regard, the breach of the Budapest Memorandum had been a serious blow to the negative security assurances that were keys to the viability of the Treaty. Those security assurances must be restored without delay.

87. Bulgaria welcomed the political understanding reached on 2 April 2015 between Iran and the permanent members of the Security Council and Germany and hoped that a mutually acceptable, long-term comprehensive solution would be reached by the deadline of 30 June 2015. Unfortunately, the nuclear and ballistic missile programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea remained a source of major concern. He urged that Government to abandon its nuclear weapon programme and to re-establish compliance with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation and with IAEA safeguards as soon as possible. There was a clear need to tighten the withdrawal provisions of the Treaty so as to prevent abuse by States that were found to be in non-compliance. The international community should be alerted to the fact that some countries might misread article X in such a way that they felt encouraged not to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty.

88. Efforts to convene a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction should continue, despite the complex situation in that region of the world. Bulgaria welcomed the tireless work of the facilitator in that regard.

89. The operation of the Treaty was ensured by the application of the IAEA safeguards system. Bulgaria

fully supported the Agency and called upon any States that had not yet done so to negotiate and ratify additional protocols to their respective safeguard agreements. Bulgaria, as a State party that had developed nuclear energy for peaceful uses for over 40 years in compliance with the highest safety, security and non-proliferation standards, reaffirmed its support for the inalienable right of all States parties to the Treaty to do the same.

90. His Government welcomed the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety, aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and increasing transparency, and urged all States parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety to fulfil the objectives of the Declaration. The international nuclear non-proliferation regime was an important framework for the development of nuclear applications for peaceful purposes. The States parties of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation should agree on a set of specific measures for ensuring the responsible development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the best safety, security and non-proliferation conditions.

91. **Mr. Mendoza-García** (Costa Rica) said that the current Review Conference must not accept modest results or be satisfied with maintaining the status quo. State security was an outdated paradigm that nevertheless remained the basis for maintaining 16,000 nuclear warheads, many of which were on high alert and susceptible to cyberattacks. Instead, collective human security should be placed at the centre of policymaking, in which peace and security should be considered a global public good. Unilateral or bilateral reductions that were not verifiable, transparent and not under the supervision of IAEA did nothing to contribute to that goal; nor did delaying the convening of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

92. True peace and security were achieved by preventing the horizontal and vertical proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and by insisting on compliance with all the obligations arising from the relevant treaties. They required States to deliver on their commitments under article VI of the Treaty, in particular, steps 6, 8 and 9 of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and action 5 of the action plan contained in that Final Document. Peace and security also involved honouring the Charter of the United Nations, especially Articles 10 and 26, and

required not just the control of weapons, but also climate control, the reduction of inequality, the elimination of poverty, and democracy.

93. The paralysis in the Conference on Disarmament, which was not representative of the total membership of the United Nations, had motivated many States, including Costa Rica, and a range of other stakeholders to demand the initiation of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and progress towards a legally binding instrument that would prohibit the development, production, storage, possession, transfer, deployment and use of nuclear weapons.

94. The issue of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons was gaining recognition and related discussions had created momentum in the international community to find ways to rid the world of nuclear weapons. Further proof of that momentum had been the successful experience in 2013 of the open-ended working group to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons.

95. The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons violated international law, particularly international humanitarian law, as had been recognized by the International Court of Justice. Such weapons did not respect the principle of proportionality or the obligation to refrain from causing harm in an indiscriminate or needless manner. In the past, the recognition of the unacceptable humanitarian consequences of the use of such weapons had preceded their prohibition and eventual elimination. The Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, the updated draft of which had been submitted to the United Nations by Costa Rica, together with Malaysia, could be negotiated as a stand-alone agreement or as part of a package of agreements. One interim agreement of great potential value would be a universal, legally binding instrument on negative security assurances in order to build and strengthen mutual confidence between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States.

96. Lastly, he called on all States to endorse the pledge made by the Austrian Government following the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, which CELAC Heads of State and Government had recently endorsed, and to negotiate an instrument to ban nuclear weapons.

97. **Mr. Zerbo** (Executive Secretary, Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization) said that nuclear weapons proliferation was a truly transboundary threat that put all States at risk. A system of laws and treaties established to counter that threat helped to ensure the rule of law. It was generally recognized that the indefinite extension of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation in 1995 had been achieved through a set of political conditions, one of which had been the conclusion of a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than 1996. Good-faith compliance with the obligations under article VI of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation included ratification by all States parties of the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which was aimed at strengthening the non-proliferation and disarmament regime as a whole. It was difficult to understand therefore the failure of States parties to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force.

98. It was important to recognize that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty had strengthened the international norm against nuclear testing: every test conducted since its adoption had been met with universal condemnation. It had been demonstrated that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was internationally and effectively verifiable. The international monitoring system provided a detection capability far better than what had been thought to be attainable 20 years previously. The deterrent value of the system was such that no State could confidently carry out a clandestine test.

99. Furthermore, the monitoring technologies under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty had proven their value in civil and scientific areas, as demonstrated by the essential role played by the noble gas network in the aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident. The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and its monitoring assets were at the disposal of the international community to support national security needs; to contribute to regional stability as a significant confidence-building measure; to reinforce non-discriminatory and participatory multilateral arms control; and to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime.

100. Expressions of support for the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty continued to be made and Member States had invested heavily in that Treaty's verification regime, yet the reality was that the Treaty would not enter into force without ratification by the remaining Annex 2

States. Some progress was noteworthy: China had connected its monitoring stations to the Preparatory Commission's system; the United States Government was engaged in an education campaign with ratification of the Treaty as the end goal; and there were indications that Israel could be the next Annex 2 State to sign the Treaty.

101. He welcomed other evidence of progress, such as the personal commitment expressed by Pope Francis to a nuclear-weapon-free world; the pledge by the Russian Federation to complete the international monitoring system stations on its territory within two years and to promote the Treaty at the highest political levels; and the vital support provided by the United Kingdom towards universal ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization provided an organizational framework to enable the remaining Annex 2 States to pursue ratification in accordance with their constitutional processes. The Treaty's operational verification regime had been demonstrated in late 2014 through the full-scale simulation of the on-site inspection in Jordan.

102. Determined leadership was needed now, both from the remaining Annex 2 States, to move towards ratification, and from the States having already ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, to make that Treaty a top priority. Bringing that Treaty into force was the responsibility of all States parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation. Just as importantly, if action was not taken, all States parties would bear the responsibility for letting the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty fail.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.